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INTRODUCTION
Whatever the views of most Americans on homosexuality, they should
nevertheless care about prohibitions on gay sex, for those laws reveal the
precariousness of more popular freedoms. In that spirit, this Note compares
two legal approaches to the right to privacy through the lens of sodomy
laws.' The battle in federal court over sodomy laws ended in 1986 with the
Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,2 but state-based
challenges are flourishing. Last year, a Minnesota trial court struck down
that state's sodomy law in a decision that became the law of the state for
want of appeal by the attorney general.3 Meanwhile, a Louisiana judge
1. This Note considers sodomy laws generally, and most sodomy laws apply to both
opposite- and same-sex acts. Further, although the technical common-law definition applied only
to anal sex, the phrase "sodomy laws" as used in legal opinions and in this Note refers to laws
that prohibit both oral and anal sex. But at the end of the day, we all know that the word
"sodomy" means one thing to most people, at least on first impression: men having sex with other
men. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he
proscriptions against sodomy have very ancient roots. Decisions of individuals relating to
homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western
civilization.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3. See Doe v. Ventura, No. MC 01-489 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 15, 2001) (declaring section
609.293 of the Minnesota Statutes a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy); Doe v.
Ventura, No. MC 01-489 (Minn. Dist. Ci. July 2, 2001) (granting the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification so that relief would apply statewide); Pam Louwagie, State Won't Appeal Class-
Action Sodomy Ruling, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 1, 2001, at 3B (indicating that the judge's
relief applied statewide but may not be binding on prosecutors outside her jurisdiction).
993
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
The Yale Law Journal
threw down the gauntlet to her state's supreme court, daring it to overrule
her decision that Louisiana's sodomy law violated the state constitutional
right to privacy.4 Virginia's Supreme Court refused very recently to strike
down its state's law.5 Similar challenges are pending in Texas6 and
Arkansas!
As these cases show, laws against particular sexual practices are open
to several legal challenges. Free expression, equal protection, due process,
and privacy come most quickly to mind, and it is the last of these that this
Note considers. The right to privacy8 under both the federal and various
4. See Janet McConnaughey, La. Court To Hear Sodomy Law Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan.
8, 2001, 2001 WL 3650222; Michael Perlstein, Statute Forbidding Sodomy Violates Privacy,
Judge Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 10, 2001, at 3. In 1999, Judge Carolyn Gill-
Jefferson struck down the law on privacy grounds. Later, in July 2000, the Louisiana Supreme
Court ruled in a separate criminal case that there was no state constitutional right to privacy that
protected sodomy, see State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So. 2d 501, and it ordered her to
reconsider her decision. On March 9, 2001, immediately after oral argument on the subject, the
judge affirmed her earlier decision. See Transcript of Oral Argument and Ruling at 15-17, La.
Electorate of Gays and Lesbians, Inc. v. State, No. 94-9260 (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. Mar. 9, 2001);
Perlstein, supra. The Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to schedule oral argument on the appeal.
The effort to invalidate the law has run eight years and come before the state supreme court four
times. Interview with John D. Rawls, Counsel for Plaintiff in Louisiana Electorate (Nov. 14,
2001).
5. See DePriest v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 1 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding sodomy
convictions against a state privacy challenge where the defendants solicited or committed the acts
in public). On June 1, 2001, a panel of the Virginia Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of
the case, and the full court denied a petition for rehearing without comment on July 27. Rhonda
Smith, Virginia Sodomy Case Loses Final Appeal, WASH. BLADE, Aug. 17, 2001,
http://www.geocities.com/privacylawsfUSA/Virginia/vanews84.htm.
6. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
7. See Traci Shurley, Same-Sex Sodomy Law Deemed Unconstitutional, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Mar. 24, 2001, at Al. The state is appealing the decision in Picado v. Jegley, No. CV
99-7048 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2001), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/sections/library/
decisions/picadodecision.pdf, to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which has agreed to hear it. See
Arkansas High Court Considers Gay Sex Ban, GAY.COM NEWS, Oct. 31, 2001, at
http://www.gay.com/news/articlc.htnml?2001/10/31/3.
8. For a comprehensive survey of the right to privacy, its philosophical foundations, and its
evolution in American case law, see RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY
LAW (1999). See also RICHARD F. HIXSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY (1987) (reviewing the
evolution of the right to privacy at the federal level). A critical distinction exists between
informational and substantive rights to privacy. Informational privacy protects details we would
like to keep from public view, like medical records, but it provides no liberty, no substantive right
to perform certain acts like abortion. The right to privacy was originally conceived as a cause of
action in tort against those who exposed personal information to the public. See Samuel D.
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); see also
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) (describing the tort of invasion of
privacy as a compilation of four different torts). Substantive privacy, the subject of this Note, is a
right held against the state's power to legislate, and it has two different origins. First, and most
familiar, is the personhood justification, which asserts that the ability to make choices within a
certain realm free from state intrusion is essential to human dignity. See Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The makers of our Constitution
undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.... They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men."); William M. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to
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state constitutions has been advanced as a basis for invalidating sodomy
laws with varying degrees of success. Surveying the privacy case law at
both the federal and state levels, this Note finds that courts upholding
sodomy laws had a particular vision of the right to privacy; one that turned
on the nature of the act nominated for protection. But this approach to
privacy betrays the basic philosophical premise of a privacy right, that the
state should not be able to reach beyond certain boundaries with its power,
including the judicial gaze. On the other hand, certain state decisions
striking down sodomy laws approached the question of privacy from the
standpoint of a content-neutral boundary: It does not matter so much what
act you wish to commit in private, but rather whether the act falls on your
side of the line, within the private sphere. Rather than evaluate sodomy's
place in our cultural tradition, these courts asked only whether the sex act is
private, in the sense of being invisible, contained, or harmless.9
Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 212, 214 (" [O]ur Constitution and our system
of constitutional government reflect a decision that government is limited in the powers and
methods it may use. Powers are withheld from government or, alternatively stated, freedoms or
liberties of the citizen are set forth in order to guarantee that the individual, his personality, and
those things stamped with his personality shall be free from official interference, except where a
rational basis for intrusion exists."); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human
Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971 (1964) (deriving the right to
privacy from human dignity, such that without protection provided against the government, a
citizen "would be less of a man, less of a master over his own destiny"); Joseph Kupfer, Privacy,
Autonomy, and Self-Concept, 24 AM. PHIL. Q. 81, 82 (1987) ("[P]rivacy is essential to the
development and maintenance of an autonomous self."); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,
102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 753 (1989) (" [Slome acts, faculties, or qualities are so important to our
identity as persons-as human beings-that they must remain inviolable, at least as against the
state.").
Second is the social contract justification, which is rooted more in a fear of tyranny than a
concern with human flourishing. Every law encroaches on man's natural right to complete
freedom (an absolute right to privacy, if you will), and it must therefore be justified by some
countervailing, legitimate end of government (usually the prevention of harm). See generally JOEL
FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 9-15 (1984) (outlining and critiquing the "presumptive case for
liberty"); OWEN M. FISS, 8 TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 159
(Stanley N. Katz ed., 1993) ("Such limits [of the social contract] require that every exercise of
federal power be justified in terms of the ends for which that power was created."); JOHN LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690)
(defining a social contract understanding of the state). But see Anita L. Allen, Social Contract
Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1999) (criticizing the overuse of the
term "social contract" to describe "just about any example of a judge grappling with issues of
freedom from government restraint").
In the end, the distinction between social contract and personhood justifications is a false
one, because the logic of the two rationales converges: Limits on state power are essential to
human dignity. Courts tend to draw on both rationales without distinguishing them, and so this
Note will not belabor the distinction.
9. The use of third-party harm as a limit on freedom is generally traced to JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 70-86 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1975) (1859). Mill concludes
"that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection." Id. at 10. He offers several
justifications for this principle of limited government. One is a concern for human flourishing akin
to the personhood justification for privacy: Allowing individuals the freedom to make choices is
"a mode of strengthening [people's] active faculties, exercising their judgment." Id. at 101.
Another, which he calls "the most cogent reason for restricting the interference of government[,]
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Looking deeper, this Note finds that the cases with content-neutral
approaches to sodomy laws all rested on content-neutral privacy precedents,
while the federal right to privacy was born in a murky ad hoc analysis of
tradition, where protection existed only for activities the majority already
valued. The strong claim of this Note, then, is that Griswold v.
Connecticut"0 and its progeny laid the groundwork for Bowers by failing to
articulate a philosophically sound understanding of privacy. Meanwhile, a
different standard guided states that struck down their sodomy laws. The
implications of this comparison extend beyond the narrow question of
sodomy laws to substantive privacy more generally. To the extent the right
to privacy exists to limit state intrusion on important choices, how you
frame the question of privacy dramatically affects both the community's
discourse about rights and, often, the ultimate legal outcome of
unanticipated questions.
Part I explores the federal approach to privacy jurisprudence. Contrary
to popular liberal wisdom, the Court decided Bowers correctly, given how it
framed the question of privacy rights in earlier cases. State courts upholding
sodomy laws against federal privacy challenges prior to Bowers confirm
that it was the most reasonable interpretation of precedent. But the federal
approach to privacy, which I call "act-based," is illogical and adverse to
the right itself. Part II presents an alternative, the "spatial approach," using
three states as examples. All three states share with the Supreme Court an
extratextual approach to privacy rights: Their constitutions do not expressly
guarantee that right. The biggest difference between the two categories of
jurisdictions is their initial approaches to privacy. How the courts originally
defined privacy, usually decades earlier, foreshadowed how they would
later rule on sodomy. Decisions from other courts striking down sodomy
laws had a similar tack. This spatial approach is superior to the act-based
approach because it often produces a progressive result in privacy cases,
and even where it does not,1" it yields a more useful discourse about rights
is the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power," id. at 102, an echo of social contract theory.
Courts often quote Mill's conclusion, but not his rationales, leaving the harm principle
ungrounded. This Note, to the extent that it assumes a substantive right to privacy, will not choose
between its rationales (e.g., personhood and social contract). Instead, I offer here a better test (a
spatial approach) for the limits on the right, one that is more consistent with either rationale.
Therefore, although some attempt to justify the harm principle is made, see infra Section H.F, this
Note seeks more to deploy the harm principle than to justify it.
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11. Few would believe that prostitution should be legalized, even though the arguments
against sodomy laws would seem to compel that result. For general overviews of the right to
privacy and its application to sexual acts, see SEX, MORALITY, AND THE LAW (Lori Gruen &
George E. Panichas eds., 1997), which discusses homosexuality, prostitution, pornography,
abortion, sexual harassment, and rape; Meredith Gould, "Not the Law's Business": The Current
Predicament for Sexual Minorities, in LEGISLATING MORALITY 315 (Kim Ezra Shienbaum ed.,
1988); and Kim Ezra Shienbaum, Overview: Perspectives on Sex, the State and Public Policy, in
LEGISLATING MORALITY, supra, at 1.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. I111: 993
Privacy and Sodomy
in our polity. To the extent that the spatial approach was abandoned years
ago in the realm of the criminal law, this Note urges its reappraisal and
reincorporation at the federal level. 2
I. FEDERAL LAW: THE FUNDAMENTAL ACTS TEST FOR PRIVACY
The Supreme Court's decision not to overturn Georgia's sodomy law as
applied to homosexuals created a firestorm of opposition and galvanized the
gay rights movement. 3 For many, the decision was plainly wrongheaded, 4
and its tone needlessly hostile. Particularly from the perspective of those
outside the legal profession, the case went far beyond the narrow question
of privacy rights to the political status (or lack thereof) of homosexuals. Yet
for all of the visceral reaction against it, Bowers applied the same test for
privacy rights as previous decisions on sexual privacy, and it did so
correctly. Accepting arguendo the Court's framing of the question, there
should be little doubt it reached the right answer. Those who think
otherwise are under the misimpression that precedent in the realm of sexual
privacy created content-neutral boundaries. In reality, there is no federal
right to privacy that shields us from the gaze of the state, and there has
never been one. The Court's sexual privacy jurisprudence has relied on a
case-by-case evaluation of the act in question, regardless of whether it can
be viewed from the outside or whether it creates third-party harms. In doing
so, the Court has asked a majoritarian question of value prior to the
question of privacy. Something is private only if the Court (and most of
America) does not mind watching.
12. See infra notes 187-190 and accompanying text.
13. See EVE KOsOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 6 (1990).
14. For arguments that the Supreme Court's pre-Bowers privacy cases compel protection of
same-sex intimacy, see WALTER BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 52-73
(1973); John Arthur, Privacy, Homosexuality, and the Constitution, in READINGS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 570 (John Arthur & William H. Shaw eds., 2d ed. 1993); Rubenfeld, supra
note 8, at 748; and Mark John Kappelhoff, Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: Is There a Right to
Privacy?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 487 (1988). See also Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE
L.J. 1493 (1988) (criticizing the Court's approach to privacy, particularly its authoritarian reliance
on history and tradition, and urging a republican approach that appreciates Hardwick's claim as a
political right); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (1992)
(rejecting privacy as the paradigm for understanding the law's regulation of homosexuality). For a
comprehensive survey of regulations of sodomy at the time Bowers was decided, see Yao Apasu-
Gbotsu et al, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual
Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521 (1986). For criticism of both Bowers and state cases striking
down sodomy laws, comparing Bowers to its Kentucky and Texas analogues, see Susan Ayres,
Coming Out: Decision-Making in State and Federal Sodomy Cases, 62 ALB. L. REv. 355 (1998).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
20021
The Yale Law Journal
A. Bowers v. Hardwick
Simply put, the Supreme Court decided not to strike down sodomy laws
as applied to homosexuals because there is no American tradition of
accepting homosexual sex. From the very beginning of the opinion, the
Supreme Court in Bowers cast the case as a question of the "fundamental
rights of homosexuals." 5 In asking repeatedly whether homosexuals in
particular have a "fundamental right.., to engage in sodomy," 16 it is no
wonder the Court concluded such a claim is "at best, facetious."' 7 The
Court, in the following paragraph, set out the test for determining whether a
given act is fundamental and falls within the constitutional boundaries of
the right to privacy:
Striving to assure itself and the public that announcing rights not
readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much more
than the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the
States and the Federal Government, the Court has sought to identify
the nature of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial
protection.... [T]his category includes those fundamental liberties
that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were
sacrificed" ... [and] those liberties that are "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition." i8
In other words, the test for whether homosexual sodomy is protected by a
constitutional right to privacy requires an evaluation of the traditional status
of homosexual sex per se. And, if we ask whether there has been a tradition
of treating homosexuals as equal, much less accepting sodomy as normal,
healthy sexual activity, there is little doubt that the answer to that question
is no. 1" The extent of the right to privacy depends on whether the act you
wish to commit is fundamental, meaning "traditional," necessary for
"ordered liberty," or "deeply rooted" in history-valued by the majority of
people in our nation over time. It relies on an act-based conception of
15. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986); see also id. at 188 n.2 ("We express no
opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as applied to other acts of sodomy.").
16. Id. at 190; see also id. at 191 ("constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
sodomy"); id. ("fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy"); id. at 192 ("a
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy"); id. at 196 (Burger,
C.J., concurring) (" [I]n constitutional terms there is no such thing as a fundamental right to
commit homosexual sodomy.").
17. id. at 194 (majority opinion).
18. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937); and Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
19. See Gayle S. Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,
in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 3, 13-14 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993)
(discussing the traditional hierarchy of sexual practices in America).
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privacy and ignores spatial boundaries entirely. Of course, by these terms,
there is no privacy right to homosexual sodomy.
One might object, as Justice Blackmun did in dissent, that the law at
issue applied equally to heterosexual sodomy.2" This is, of course, true, but
as the privacy question has been framed in terms of fundamental acts, the
Court could easily have reached the conclusion that there is no fundamental
right to heterosexual oral or anal sex.2 Scientific research suggested a
majority of Americans engaged in oral sex,22 but the behavior remained
taboo, even for straight persons.2 Bowers was not the first decision to
declare that "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee of
personal privacy." 2 Nor was it the only case to rely on history to evaluate
whether a certain activity falls within the right to privacy. 5 The Court's
reliance on history put it on precarious ground since the history of attitudes
toward homosexuals is, at least, contested, 6 but as I explain next, the
methodology of Bowers followed precedent.
20. "A fair reading of the statute and of the complaint clearly reveals that the majority has
distorted the question this case presents.... [T]he Court's almost obsessive focus on homosexual
activity is particularly hard to justify in light of the broad language Georgia has used." Bowers,
478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
21. See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 365-66 (Iowa 1976) (Reynoldson, J., dissenting).
The court in Pilcher struck down the state's gender-neutral sodomy law only as applied to
consenting heterosexual couples (but not homosexuals) based on federal case law. In dissent,
Justice Reynoldson argued that the majority should not have considered the private, consensual
nature of the sex but only the specific nature of the act in determining "whether the right of
consenting non-spouses to engage in sodomitical activity is fundamental in a constitutional
sense." Id.
22. EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 103 (1994); John Arthur, Privacy, Homosexuality, and the
Constitution, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 570, 577 (John Arthur & William H.
Shaw eds., 2d ed. 1993) (noting that studies suggest approximately ninety percent of heterosexual
couples engage in oral sex and twenty-five percent in anal sex (citing Brief of Amici Curiae
American Psychological Association and American Public Health Association in Support of
Respondents, Bowers (No. 85-140))).
23. "President Clinton's well-publicized dalliance with Monica Lcwinsky has helped
popularize an act that had long been taboo.... [Tlhe Sexgate scandal brought the discussion of
oral sex out into the open and planted it firmly in the cultural lexicon." Christopher Francescani,
Sex and the City Teen: An Old Taboo Is Suddenly a Popular Practice, N.Y. POST, July 25, 1999,
at 25.
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
25. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (discussing Roe v. Wade). It is not the last
case either. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-28 (1997) (relying on the tradition
of laws against suicide in upholding a state's prohibition on physician-assisted suicide); Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-26 (1989) (relying on history to reject a biological father's
claim to visitation rights with his child, who was born of an adulterous relationship).
26. See JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY (1980);
David M. Halperin, Sex Before Sexuality: Pederasty, Politics, and Power in Classical Athens, in
HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST 37 (Martin Duberman et al.
eds., 1989).
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B. The Ambiguous Triad: Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe
Three cases dealing with sexual privacy paved the road for Bowers by
relying on a certain understanding of privacy: It is a right that protects those
acts that are fundamental to personhood, as defined by history. Although
the spatial theories of privacy played cameo roles, the federal sexual
triumvirate ultimately rejected them.
Griswold v. Connecticut, the first Supreme Court case to recognize a
federal right to substantive privacy, struck down a state law prohibiting the
use of contraceptive devices.27 The basis for the right, however, was unclear
from the opinion. In the abstract, the right to privacy is a freedom from state
action within certain "zones." 28 Those zones of privacy are created by the
specific freedoms in the Bill of Rights. The Fourth Amendment, therefore,
in prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, actually prohibits much
more. It offers a person security in his home against various intrusions,
including, the opinion seems to say, the intrusion by the police "to search
the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives." " From the first part of the opinion, then, rose a general
principle that there is a line drawn between the state and the home, and the
government must show something extra to cross that line with regulations.
This sounds like the spatial theory of privacy.
But in applying the right to privacy to the statute at issue, much more
hung on the Court's approval of marriage than the privacy of the home or
limits on state power. The last two paragraphs emphasized the uniqueness
of marriage and the "maximum destructive impact upon that relationship"
that the law would have:30 "This law... operates directly on an intimate
relation of husband and wife . . . ." , The Court was "repuls[ed]" at the
thought of police searching "marital bedrooms" in particular-not the
bedrooms of masturbators, fornicators, adulterers, homosexuals, or others
outside that "noble" association.32 As a state court interpreting Griswold
said, "The rationale of the Griswold holding flows from its eulogy of the
marital status and lacking such status the rule has no foundation." 33 The
emphasis on status indicated that only particular acts (those between
married persons) were protected. Certainly, the decision had some elements
of a spatial test, but they disappeared by the end of the opinion.34
27. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28. Id. at 484.
29. Id. at 485.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 482.
32. Id. at 485-86.
33. Hughes v. State, 287 A.2d 299, 305 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972).
34. Justice Goldberg, concurring and joined by two others, emphasized the Ninth
Amendment, but he limited his reading in the same way by emphasizing the "basic and
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And so, what began as a potentially sweeping opinion ended as a
narrow act of judicial benevolence to a particular class of persons. When
unmarried persons challenged a similar law in Massachusetts,35 Griswold
was broadened to include them,36 but without accounting for the necessary
philosophical shift. The Court struck down the law because it lacked a
rational relationship to its ends and because it violated the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court avoided deciding whether access to contraception is
"'fundamental [to] human rights."' 37 But assuming arguendo that Griswold
did stand for a right to contraceptive devices, the Court recognized that in
Griswold "the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship." 3 It responded:
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.39
Eisenstadt's answer to Griswold, then, was that because the act in question,
deciding whether to engage in procreative sex, was equally "fundamental"
to both married and single persons, it fell within the zone of privacy
regardless of the marital status of the parties involved. To the extent that
Eisenstadt was a case about privacy, it suggested that the right to privacy
must be enjoyed on equal terms, but it failed to provide a basis for the right
itself. The foundation of Griswold, the uniqueness of the marital
relationship, was replaced by something even more amorphous, the
"fundamentally affects" test. After Eisenstadt, the basis for the right to
privacy was even less clear, because the Court there denied the role of
tradition in deciding what acts must be protected. Whatever was
"fundamental" was private, which required a case-by-case analysis of the
act in question. The language of the line drawn at the door to the marital
bedroom, the idea that some locations are too sacred to be subject to
scrutiny, was left behind in the opening paragraphs of Griswold.
fundamental" nature of the "right of privacy in marriage." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487, 491
(Goldberg, J., concurring). This is why it is "beyond doubt" that the Connecticut statutes
prohibiting adultery and fornication, as well as other "regulation[s] of sexual promiscuity or
misconduct," are constitutional. Id. at 498-99.
35. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 21-21A (West 2000) (prohibiting distribution of
contraceptive devices for the purpose of preventing pregnancy except to married persons by a
physician).
36. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
37. Id. at 453 (quoting the opinion below).
38. Id.
39. Id. (citation omitted, second emphasis added).
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Third was Roe v. Wade.4" The bulk of the opinion recounted the history
of laws against abortion, with the Court concluding that those prohibitions
were not as deeply rooted as conventionally thought.4' This was an essential
foundation for the privacy analysis that followed, which returned tradition
to its central place in act-based privacy analysis. The Court made reference
to "a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy," 4 but it qualified this
spatial language by saying that precedent "make[s] it clear that only
personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy" 43-
picking up on the "fundamentally affects" language at the end of
Eisenstadt and providing the test used later in Bowers. A woman's right to
an abortion was linked to the historical tradition of permitting abortion that
the Court found." Without saying where it lies, what it contains, or where it
ends, the Court asserted that the right to privacy is "broad enough" to allow
a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy a5 As with its precedents,
little in Roe provided the basis for this right. The Court specifically denied,
however, that the right to privacy guarantees "an unlimited right to do with
one's body as one pleases." 
4 6
These three decisions laid the groundwork that made Bowers a
consistent decision. The triad of sexuality opinions dealt only with
heterosexual sex, and specifically the decision of whether to procreate. In
that sense, they were narrow in scope and, as Justice White pointed out in
Bowers, completely unrelated to gay sex.47 None of these opinions provided
a solid explanation of the origin, nature, or limits of the right to privacy. It
began in the penumbras of Griswold and ended in the Due Process Clause
of Roe. All that remained consistent was the test for what counted as
private: acts that are fundamental or traditional, valued by a majority of
people. This is an act-based conception of the right to privacy; there exists
no line beyond which the Court will refuse to look, no truly private space
into which a citizen can withdraw and do as he pleases.
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41. Id. at 136 (" [l]t now appear[s] doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a
common-law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus."); id. at 140 ("It is thus
apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the
major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most
American statutes currently in effect.").
42. Id. at 152.
43. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 140 ("[A] woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy
than she does in most States today.").
45. Id. at 153.
46. Id. at 154.
47. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
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C. State Decisions in Line with Bowers
Earlier I made the claim that Bowers was consistently decided, and pre-
Bowers state court sodomy decisions bear that out. These courts used the
same test for privacy in Griswold and its progeny that I have claimed
existed, and their methodology, evaluating the act and the history of
disapproval of homosexuals, was very similar to Bowers's. Since this Note
compares two approaches to the right to privacy, it makes sense to review
briefly more decisions of the Bowers type and flesh out what I mean by the
act-based approach to privacy and sodomy laws. These decisions support
my causal claim: To the extent these state court decisions can be said to
flow from Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, they suggest that you can predict
how a sodomy law will fare from how a jurisdiction first framed the right to
privacy.
State courts looking to Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe to decide whether
their sodomy laws were unconstitutional did two things. First, they
considered the act itself and its traditional unpopularity. At the state level,
applying federal law, judges made no secret of their personal discomfort.
Instead of explaining the actual act two defendants stood accused of
performing, the Arkansas Supreme Court preferred to note (in the third
sentence of an opinion upholding the state's sodomy law) that the arresting
officer vomited three times.48 "Sodomy has been considered wrong since
early times in our civilization," opined the Arizona Supreme Court.49 The
state has long had authority to make "unnatural sexual relations a crime,"
said another." The right to consensual sex is not "of such a fundamental
nature [nor] so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' to warrant its
inclusion in the guarantee of personal privacy."'" It is nothing more than a
"perverted sex practice," punished "in the promotion of morality and
decency." 5 Second, these decisions understood federal privacy law to be
status-based, and therefore act-based, as opposed to spatial. As much as
possible, the right to privacy established by Griswold was limited to those
acts linked with the family and procreation. So, for instance, one court held
that "the [federal] right of privacy is closely related to the decision whether
or not to have a child."53 The Supreme Court "was concerned only with
government trespass upon the sanctity of home and family life and offered
48. Carter v. State, 500 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Ark. 1973). But see supra note 7 (discussing a
pending challenge to the law).
49. State v. Bateman, 547 P.2d 6, 10 (Ariz. 1976).
50. People v. Ragsdale, 177 Cal. App. 2d 676, 679 (Ct. App. 1960).
51. State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 68 (R.I. 1980) (citations omitted).
52. Kelly v. State, 412 A.2d 1274, 1275 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980).
53. Santos, 413 A.2d at 67-68. Never mind that sodomy can be understood as a form of birth
control.
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no privacy protection to the plaintiffs."54 And, sodomy "is obviously no
portion of marriage, home or family life."" " [T]o strike down a statute
proscribing cunnilingus, fellatio, and the whole field of other unnatural or
perverted sexual practice.., is not consistent with the description of the
marriage relationship and right of privacy described by Mr. Justice
Douglas." 
5 6
All of these opinions share an acceptance that the fundamental question
is whether "the right of privacy applies to the conduct of the type
prohibited."57 They did not consider a spatial test for privacy, noting only
secondarily whether the act was visible or not. In other words, my
description of the federal test for the right to privacy, as an act-based test,
was what most state courts adopted when facing the same question Bowers
faced, but beforehand. This suggests not only that Bowers was consistent
with its precedents (since other courts came out the same way), but also that
it was not a fluke: There is some causal connection between a court's
understanding of privacy's origin and the viability of sodomy laws. That, in
turn, suggests that how you frame the question of privacy determines how a
court will come out on a privacy challenge: Act-based tests for privacy
always let sodomy laws stand. To the extent I have identified a discernible
methodology in the federal case law, I am now in a position to critique that
methodology and to offer an alternative.
D. The Problem with Federal Privacy Jurisprudence
The act-based test for privacy that the Supreme Court uses is
problematic for several reasons: It is arbitrary, depending on the judge's
preferences; it is a weak individual right to the extent it relies on the will of
the majority; it fails to protect the very individuality that justifies the right;
and it is paradoxical, hiding only what we like to view while at the same
time failing to protect most of what we would like to hide.
First, it is more arbitrary than a content-neutral spatial test would be. As
the emotional language of the privacy opinions indicates, the conclusion
that certain decisions and actions are fundamental enough to deserve
protection is charged with personal prejudices about the most intimate
issues. Not so with the declaration that certain spaces are "private," simply
because the latter decision is relatively neutral. It does not require the judge
to engage his personal biases, while the act-based test requires that he rely
54. People v. Penn, 247 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (citing Doe v.
Commonwealth, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (upholding Virginia's sodomy law), aff'd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976)).
55. Kelly, 412 A.2d at 1275 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Hughes v. State, 287 A.2d 299, 304 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972).
57. Neville v. State, 430 A.2d 570, 576 (Md. 1981).
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on them as a proxy for the majority's. Deciding what physical boundaries
deserve protection leaves less room for subjectivity.58 And even though
there will always be dispute over where to draw the content-neutral line,
any line allows you some space to which you may withdraw and act as you
wish. The judge may not like what you do, he may not think it rooted in
personhood and deserving of protection, but that does not matter as long as
you are able to hide beyond the boundary created by the right to privacy
(and there are no externalities or other justifications for legislative
intervention). Ultimately, this allows more freedom for people to deviate
from the majority's preferences.
Second, a right to privacy is pointless if you can only hide what
everyone approves of, essentially the standard articulated by the Supreme
Court in the fundamental rights test. That which the majority approves of
(say, contraception as opposed to homosexual sex) needs less protection
because the consequences of discovery, in terms of embarrassment,
prosecution, and so forth, are much less severe. As the dissent in Griswold
pointed out, laws that annoy the majority of people are more easily fixed
through the legislative process.5 9
Third, an act-based conception of privacy is ultimately self-defeating
when written into law. Instead of asking whether a particular act is
fundamental to you, the petitioner (perhaps a homosexual), the Court's test
asks whether the act is traditionally important. This makes an individual
right, by definition a right against the will of the majority, dependent on
that very will. But privacy is most valuable when the majority condemns
the proposed conduct. An act-based conception of privacy is ultimately
58. For example, it is a constitutional no-brainer that the law may prohibit the sale of sex
toys. See Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020, 1024 n.1 (5th Cir. June 1981)
(upholding a Texas obscenity law that, inter alia, outlawed the sale of "device[s] designed and
marketed as useful primarily for stimulation of the human genital organs"); see also Sewell v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 982 (1978) (dismissing the appeal of a conviction under a similar statute for
want of a substantial federal question); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (sustaining
obscenity laws (hat prohibit obscene devices). "Artificial vaginas" and "rubber devices shaped
like penises" are so culturally marginal that the Supreme Court did not pause in Sewell before
rejecting claims that the Constitution provides for the freedom to sell them. Choice of
contraceptive methods, however, falls within the penumbras of the Bill of Rights. Of course, there
is a serious distinction between condoms and sex toys; lack of access to the former has far greater
consequences. But from the standpoint of the right to privacy, personhood is as implicated (and
compromised) by regulations of what devices you can use with your partner. The judgment that
you may use condoms but not sex toys in your home, because the former is more rooted to your
dignity, is arbitrary.
Of course, a judge's private biases might come into play in deciding what counts as a private
space. For example, a socially conservative judge might find that a parked car is private when a
married heterosexual couple is necking and arrested for public lewdness, but that same judge
might conclude otherwise if the couple were gay. Still, once the judge concludes that the space is
private for the straight couple, he is bound to use the same line between public and private in any
subsequent gay case.
59. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 531 (1985) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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self-defeating because it fails to protect the individuality, the deviation from
the norm, that is the very reason for its existence.
Fourth, there is something paradoxical about a right to privacy that
exists only under the approving gaze of the judge. The act-based right to
privacy requires observation and judgment of exactly what you want to hide
from view. In other words, the Court must first scrutinize the act publicly
before it can be kept private. This is odd since the right to privacy is most
meaningful when we wish to shield ourselves from the gaze and judgment
of others. Without that ability to withdraw, there is no real right to privacy,
because the Court is always looking.
Fifth, and finally, the Court's "fundamental to ordered liberty"
standard is a high bar to reach to shield most of the banalities of our lives
from public view. Consider the article that first conceived of a "right to
privacy" as "the right to be let alone." 6" Brandeis and Warren proposed a
right to privacy that is content-neutral, in that the individual is permitted to
"fix the limits of the publicity" given to his "thought, sentiment, or
emotion" " wholly independent of the material on which, or the means by
which, the thought, sentiment, or emotion is expressed."61 The right against
publicity protects "the acts and sayings of a man in his social and domestic
relations," " even the totally banal "domestic occurrence," such as whether
a couple had dinner or not the night before.63 The right exists regardless of
the harm caused by the invasion, whether trivial or great: "[I]f privacy is
once recognized as a right entitled to legal protection, the interposition of
the courts cannot depend on the particular nature of the injuries
resulting."' The right proposed in this seminal article was not contingent
on the fundamental nature of the information that the individual wishes to
keep private. What is fundamental is the distance an individual needs to
establish between himself and the rest of the world in order to be human.65
That line, not the acts behind it, is fundamental. This content-neutrality is
exactly what is missing in the sexual privacy cases discussed above.66
60. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 195-96 (citation omitted). Justices Brandeis and
Warren sought to ground a restraint on unauthorized commercial use of people's images or the
publication of gossip, and thus the context of the discussion differs from that of Griswold and its
progeny. The article focused on ways to keep private acts from being made public, not whether
certain private acts should be illegal, but to the extent the badge of illegality requires a public gaze
into the private sphere, similar principles are involved.
61. id. at 198-99.
62. id. at 214.
63. Id. at 201.
64. Id. at 205.
65. Id. at 196 ("The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered necessary some retreat from the world ....").
66. One might object, as Justice Blackmun did in dissent in Bowers, that the spatial approach
is very much a part of federal jurisprudence. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (" [The Court] has recognized a privacy interest with reference to
certain places without regard for the particular activities in which the individuals who occupy
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II. STATE LAW: THE SPATIAL APPROACH TO PRIVACY
Three states and assorted other decisions take an approach to privacy
that I named "spatial. ' 67 A spatial theory of privacy protects certain
physical zones by drawing lines between the government's power and some
other space or location, be it the home, the bedroom, or an individual's
body. It is "a privacy interest with reference to certain places without
regard for the particular activities in which the individuals who occupy
them are engaged." 68 Courts draw on both the social contract justification
(which emphasizes the limits of state power) and the personhood
justification (which emphasizes the distance we need from observation and
regulation in order to have dignity) to ground the spatial right to privacy,
and the opinions jumble the two together. But the important distinction is
between the spatial and the act-based approaches. Not surprisingly, the
states whose original privacy decisions involved content-neutral spatial
boundaries came out differently on the question of sodomy from the
Supreme Court. Where the state had a tradition of evaluating the right to
privacy based on more objective criteria, such as visibility or harm,
opinions evaluating sodomy had a much different ring (and result).
A. Kentucky
In 1992, Jeffrey Wasson propositioned a male undercover police officer
at a Lexington, Kentucky, parking area and was convicted under a
Kentucky statute that made same-sex sexual contact and its solicitation
misdemeanors.69 The state supreme court overturned the conviction and
struck down the sodomy statute on the ground that it violated Wasson's
them are engaged."). The cases he cited, however, all involved either the First or the Fourth
Amendment, which provided the bases for protection, not the right to privacy.
67. Five states-Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Montana, and Minnesota-have struck down
sodomy laws on state constitutional privacy grounds. Montana's constitution, however, contains
an explicit right to privacy, and it is not discussed here, for that difference makes comparison with
the Supreme Court inappropriate. See Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997). Minnesota's
challenge involved a trial court judge who entered declaratory relief to a class of plaintiffs, and the
state chose not to appeal. It remains unclear, however, whether her decision has statewide effect.
See supra note 3. New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania state courts struck down the laws based
on the grounds of equal protection, see Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980), a
consent decree, see Williams v. State, No. 98036031/CC- 1059, 1998 Extra LEXIS 260 (Cir. Ct.
Bai. City Oct. 15, 1998), and the Federal Constitution, see People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936
(N.Y. 1980). Iowa struck down its law as applied to heterosexuals only, State v. Pilcher, 242
N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976), relying on federal privacy and equal protection grounds. In 1978, the
state legislature repealed the law entirely.
68. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69. Sodomy was defined as "deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same
sex." KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie 1999). Solicitation thereof was a Class B
misdemeanor. Id. § 506.030(2)(e).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
10072002]
The Yale Law Journal
rights to privacy and equal protection under the Kentucky Constitution.7"
Repeatedly distinguishing the state and federal constitutions, the court drew
on what it called the state's "rich and compelling tradition of recognizing
and protecting individual rights from state intrusion,"7 1 depicting privacy as
a right presumptively held by an individual in all affairs absent the risk of
harm to himself or others.7" Declining to use its own voice, the court quoted
heavily language that drew a line between the government and the
individual and placed the burden on the government to justify its "intrusive
power" with something more than the morals of the majority.73
The concept of privacy relied on in Wasson is distinctly Millian,74
resembles traditional social contract theory, and has its precedent in
Commonwealth v. Campbell, a Prohibition-era case in which the court held
that the state may not prohibit the personal, private consumption of alcohol,
because it posed no danger to the safety of the public. 5 Under the aegis of a
state statute, the town of Nicholasville prohibited transporting more than a
quart of alcohol into the town."6 On appeal, the state supreme court found
70. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
71. Id. at 492.
72. See id. at 495 ("The theory of our government is to allow the largest liberty to the
individual commensurate with the public safety .. " (quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117
S.W. 383, 387 (Ky. 1909))); see also id. at 494,496-98.
73. Id. at 492 (using the words "intrusive" or "intrusion" to reference the state's power three
times on the same page); see also id, at 494 (" [Tihe highest of all moral obligations [is] to protect
each individual in the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, provided that he shall in
no wise injure his neighbor in so doing." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); id. at 494-95 ("'It is not within the competency of government to invade the privacy of
a citizen's life and to regulate his conduct in matters in which he alone is concerned .... [Let a
man therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vicious in his practice, provided he keeps
his wickedness to himself, and does not offend against the rules of public decency, he is out of the
reach of human laws."' (alteration in original) (quoting Campbell, 117 S.W. at 385-86)); id. at
496 ("'The power of the state to regulate and control the conduct of a private individual is
confined to those cases where his conduct injuriously affects others."' (quoting Commonwealth v.
Smith, 173 S.W. 340, 343 (Ky. 1915))); id. ("[I]mimorality in private... is placed beyond the
reach of state action by the guarantees of liberty in the Kentucky Constitution."); id. ("'The
[harm] principle requires liberty of taste and pursuits; ... of doing as we like ... without
impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though
they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong."' (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY (1859))); id. ("Public indignation, while given due weight, should be subject to the
overriding test of rational and critical analysis, drawing the line at harmful consequences to
others."); id. at 498 ("[L]egislating penal sanctions solely to maintain widely held concepts of
morality and aesthetics is a costly enterprise. It sacrifices personal liberty, not because the actor's
conduct results in harm to another citizen but only because it is inconsistent with the majoritarian
notion of acceptable behavior." (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. (1980))).
74. By "Millian" I mean a conception of the right to privacy that is bounded only by third-
party harms. In other words, under one reading of Mill, the legislature cannot forbid any private
act unless it has negative externalities. See supra note 9 (discussing the relationship between the
right to privacy and Mill's harm principle).
75. See 117 S.W. 383, 385-87 (Ky. 1909). The first Kentucky case to recognize a right to
privacy under state law was Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927), which recognized a
cause of action of a debtor against his creditor who posted his debt in the window of his store for
all to see.
76. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383.
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that in prescribing how far the legislature could go to regulate the sale of
alcohol, the state constitution implicitly denied it the power of prohibiting
liquor entirely." The court made a broader argument, however, that the
Bill of Rights, which declares that among the inalienable rights
possessed by the citizens is that of seeking and pursuing their safety
and happiness.., would be but an empty sound if the Legislature
could prohibit the citizen the right of owning or drinking liquor,
when in so doing he did not offend the laws of decency by being
intoxicated in public.7"
The court's argument was not that liquor possession in particular is
fundamental to ordered liberty, but rather that alcohol consumption falls
within a certain private space, one of several "matters in which [an
individual] alone is concerned" that cannot be regulated without injury to
society.79 Privacy is an absolute right that is never surrendered, even upon
entry into civil society, and the boundary it provides between the state and
the individual exists regardless of what is done within that boundary, absent
externalities. It is the space, not the act, that is protected.80 The rationale in
Campbell was followed in several cases, suggesting that it was more than
an anomaly."
The vision of privacy articulated in Campbell and affirmed in Wasson
used the state's constitution to draw a line in space between the individual
and the government, protecting all that falls behind the line, regardless of its
moral content or how fundamental it is to ordered liberty. The state must
justify any restriction of individual activity behind that line by an
externality that harms another. The content-neutral approach to privacy
established in Campbell laid the groundwork for the court in Wasson
77. Id. at 384-85.
78. Id. at 385.
79. Id.
80. At the close of the opinion, however, the court blurred the distinction by saying: "The
right to use liquor for one's own comfort, if the use is without direct injury to the public, is one of
the citizen's natural and inalienable fights, guaranteed to him by the Constitution, and cannot be
abridged ... ." Id. at 387. Nevertheless, the bulk of the opinion is devoted to defending privacy
based on injury to others, not the value of the act of alcohol possession itself.
81. See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 247 S.W. 749, 751 (Ky. 1923) (holding that intoxication in
a hotel room where no other person's peace was disturbed did not violate the state's public
drunkenness statute); Commonwealth v. Smith, 173 S.W. 340, 343 (Ky. 1915) (holding that
consumption of alcohol in a doctor's office after hours was not sufficiently injurious to others to
justify state prohibition); Adams Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 157 S.W. 908, 912 (Ky. 1913)
(holding that a law prohibiting possession of more than a gallon of alcohol "abidge[d] the
personal liberty of the citizen in the right to personally use liquor"); Hershberg v. City of
Barbourville, 133 S.W. 985, 986 (Ky. 1911) (holding that a law that prohibited smoking within
the city limits, even in the privacy of one's home, was "an invasion of his right to control his own
personal indulgences"). But see Commonwealth v. Harrelson, 14 S.W.3d 541 (Ky. 2000) (holding
Campbell inapplicable to a statute prohibiting the growth of hemp because the statute was
motivated by concern for the well-being of the citizens of Kentucky and not public morality).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
10092002]
The Yale Law Journal
eighty-three years later. In fact, the court in Wasson explicitly equated
homosexuality and alcohol as "incendiary moral issue[s]," " condemned by
society at different points in time. The burden on Wasson was to argue,
then, that his behavior did not carry with it harmful third-party effects.
Seven expert witnesses testified about the nature of homosexuality on
Wasson's behalf, while the state argued that the moral norms of the
community were sufficient to justify the law.83 The only argument
advanced by the state that the court considered at least facially valid was
that the statute existed to prevent the spread of AIDS. The court rejected
this as specious, however, concluding that there was no legislative purpose
save to "single out homosexual acts for different treatment." 84 Absent
injury to society, therefore, the court followed Campbell and declared that
sodomy fell entirely within the boundary of Wasson's right to privacy.
In other cases touching on privacy, the court took care to justify
intrusions on private space by some external harm or legitimate state
interest outside the "morals" of the public.85 Many of the cases concerned
sexual behavior in public86 or private behavior that injured minors.87 The
court upheld a statute prohibiting drunk driving even on private property
against a privacy challenge because of the danger that the driver would
leave the property and do injury outside that zone.88 But it struck down
"unreasonable" regulations of nudist societies in excess of what was
needed to preserve privacy," and it reversed a conviction for lewdness
where the only "lewd" conduct was in the "privacy" of the defendant's
home.90
82. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,495 (Ky. 1992).
83. Id. at 489-90.
84. Id. at 501.
85. See Sasaki v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1972) (upholding an abortion law
against a federal privacy challenge because of the state's compelling interest in preserving life);
Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1951) (rejecting a privacy claim by an employee whose
debts were made known to his employer by a creditor, and finding an employer has a natural
interest in having his employee pay his debts).
86. Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 865 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. 1993) (holding that the right to
privacy does not shield nude dancing in a public establishment); Western Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 605 (Ky. 1977) (upholding a conviction against a federal privacy
claim for exhibition of an obscene movie in a public movie theater); Keene v. Commonwealth,
516 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1974) (same); Cain v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. 1969) (same).
87. Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 838 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1991) (upholding against a privacy
challenge a conviction of parents who forced minors to disrobe); Bd. of Educ. v. Wood, 717
S.W.2d 837, 840 (Ky. 1986) (upholding the termination of teachers for engaging in "immoral"
behavior outside of the classroom in the privacy of their own home, i.e., smoking marijuana with
minors).
88. Lynch v. Commonwealth, 902 S.W.2d 813 (Ky. 1995).
89. See Roe v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1966) (striking down as an unreasonable
exercise of the police power a regulation that required nudist societies to surround themselves
with a twenty-foot-high wall and pay a $1000 annual tax). The court found that shielding their
neighbors' view was all that could reasonably be required of the nudists.
90. See Coleman v. Commonwealth, 247 S.W.2d 535, 535 (Ky. 1952) (reversing a conviction
based on lewdness where a man and woman were "scantily clad" in the defendant's private




Twelve years after Bowers, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down
that state's sodomy law. It also took a spatial approach to privacy, although
with a slightly different flavor. Georgia's privacy jurisprudence put more
emphasis on visibility and the importance of the home and less on the
origins and limits of state power (although it explicitly referred to the social
contract). In this regard, it relies more on the personhood justification for
privacy than the social contract justification. Concern for human dignity
and flourishing, not so much skepticism of state power, drove the court. But
this distinction (in part a construction of my own imagination) has little
practical significance: As in Kentucky, third-party harms were the only
justification for limits on private acts conducted within the privacy of one's
home.
In 1997 a jury acquitted Anthony San Juan Powell of rape and
aggravated sodomy of his wife's niece, but it convicted him of the lesser
included charge of sodomy. 9' On appeal the state supreme court ruled that
the statute violated Powell's implicit state constitutional guarantees of
privacy.92 The court emphasized the "long and distinguished history" of the
right to privacy within the state, which was the first U.S. jurisdiction to
recognize a right to privacy. 93 In saying that "a citizen's right of privacy is
strong enough to withstand a variety of attempts by the State to intrude in
the citizen's life," 94 the court recognized a boundary between the private
individual's sphere of activity and the state. The language of "intrusion" is
significant because it establishes a zone around the person, a zone that
deserves particular protection from government interference.
The court reviewed the state's privacy precedents, and then, in one
short paragraph, the court perfunctorily concluded that sodomy fell within
the right to privacy, because the act was "non-commercial" and
"occur[red] without force in a private home between persons legally
capable of consenting to the act." 95 No distinction was made between types
apartment). The court adhered to the common-law requirement that lewdness be committed in
public. It did, however, note approvingly the fornication charge against the defendant, to which he
pled guilty.
91. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1999).
92. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
93. Id. at 21 (citing Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905)). Georgia was
the first state to recognize the right, long before the Supreme Court did, but the first judicial
opinion in the United States recognizing a right to privacy was issued by a New York court. See
Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 71 N.Y.S. 876 (App. Div. 1901), rev'd, 64 N.E. 442
(N.Y. 1902).
94. Powell, 510 S.E.2d at22.
95. Id. at 24 ("We cannot think of any other activity that reasonable persons would rank as
more private and more deserving of protection from governmental interference than unforced,
private, adult sexual activity." ).
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of sexual activity. The only requirement was that the activity be within the
boundary of the home (or beyond the public gaze). Infringement of that
right would be justified only if it were "narrowly tailored to effectuate" "a
compelling state interest." 9' In this case, the court concluded the "only
possible purpose for the statute [was] to regulate the private conduct of
consenting adults, [and] the public gain[ed] no benefit." 97 Without impact
beyond the boundary, the state was powerless to regulate. The court
rejected the state's argument that "social morality" and "due regard to the
collective will of the citizens of Georgia" provided sufficient basis for the
law. Repugnance on the part of the majority did not create a compelling
justification needed to justify the invasion of privacy.98
The court's opinion relied on precedent to define privacy and its origin.
Like the Kentucky court, it preferred not to use its own voice to speak on
this controversial issue, relying instead on a 1905 libel case that identified a
right to privacy as implicit in the social contract.99 Pavesich v. New England
Life Insurance Co. was a libel suit by an artist against an insurance
company that surreptitiously used a photograph of him in an advertisement.
The court found that a right to privacy existed under the state constitution
and that it provided a basis for an action in tort."'0 The harm was injury to
the plaintiffs reputation for truthfulness: The advertisement made him out
to be a policyholder when his friends and acquaintances knew otherwise.' 1
Pavesich used history to support that the claim that the right to privacy
is as old as society. The court cited provisions of Roman law forbidding one
from attracting attention to someone who is merely minding his own
business, the common-law maxim that "every man's house is his castle"
(which made eavesdropping an indictable offense), constitutional
restrictions on searches and seizures,"' and privileged communications."'
96. id.
97. Id. at 25.
98. The court itself said it "would not condone" the conduct at issue in this case. Id. at 25-26.
99. See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69-70 (Ga. 1905). The court stated:
The individual surrenders to society many rights and privileges which he would be free
to exercise in a state of nature, in exchange for the benefits which he receives as a
member of society. But he is not presumed to surrender all those rights, and the public
has no more right... to invade the domain of those rights which it is necessarily to be
presumed he has reserved, than he has to violate the valid regulations of the organized
government under which he lives. .... A right of privacy in matters purely private is
therefore derived from natural law.
Id.
100. Although Pavesich was a civil suit, the right to privacy declared therein was grounded in
Georgia's constitution, specifically in its Due Process Clause. See id. at 71. Because the court
relied on the social contract theory to guarantee an individual's right to privacy, that right is
equally good (at least in theory) against the state and another individual, and Georgia's courts
have not distinguished between the two parties. See Robert N. Katz, The History of the Georgia
Bill of Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 83, 118-20 (1986) (tracing the evolution of the right to
privacy under Georgia's constitution).
101. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 81.
102. Id. at 71.
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Although this was a civil suit between two private parties, the logic of the
opinion (and its examples) suggested that the right to privacy exists against
the state as well as another individual. The opinion relied on a concept of
reserved rights similar to that articulated by the Tenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, one that draws a line between the individual and the state
and reserves rights to the individual unless the public good requires
otherwise. That "line of demarkation which separates the right of privacy
from the well-established rights of others" "0 is drawn according to third-
party harms:
An individual has a right to enjoy life in any way that may be most
agreeable and pleasant to him, according to his temperament and
nature, provided that in such enjoyment he does not invade the
rights of his neighbor, or violate public law or policy.... Liberty
includes the right to live as one will, so long as that will does not
interfere with the rights of another or of the public.' °5
The court analyzed the right to privacy in visual terms, equating the right to
privacy with the right to withdraw from the public gaze and do whatever
one wants in "seclusion." 106 That word, denoting the invisibility of the act,
appears five times on one page. It is aligned with "privacy" and juxtaposed
against "publicity," "exhibition," "gaze," and "public." Subject to public
duty,
the body of a person cannot be put on exhibition at any time or at
any place without his consent.... The right to withdraw from the
public gaze at such times as a person may see fit, when his presence
in public is not demanded by any rule of law, is also embraced
within the right of personal liberty." 7
Of course, it makes sense to analyze a libel-photography case this way, but
the powerful philosophical undertones of the language extend beyond the
facts at bar.
In the years after Pavesich, Georgia's courts continued to rely on this
personhood conception of privacy. They have defined it in various ways as
a right against "unnecessary public scrutiny," 08 a right "to be free from
unwarranted publicity ... [or] the unwarranted appropriation or
103. See id. at 73.
104. id. at 79.
105. Id. at 70.
106. Id.
107. id.
108. Athens Observer, Inc. v. Anderson, 263 S.E.2d 128, 130 (Ga. 1980) (granting a
newspaper's public-records request for an evaluation of university faculty that contained
disparaging remarks of named professors).
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exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs
with which the public ha[s] no legitimate concern," " "the right to define
one's circle of intimacy," "0 and the right "to be free of unwarranted
interference by the public about matters [with] which the public is not
necessarily concerned, or to be protected from any wrongful intrusion into
an individual's private life."'' The right has been construed broadly
enough to prevent the state from forcing food on a hunger-striking
prisoner,"2 to allow a quadriplegic to disconnect his ventilator and end his
life,113 to shield disclosure of information contained in public records when
they are "not the subject of 'legitimate public inquiry,' 14 and to shield
medical records from a prosecutor's ex parte subpoena."5
Where the state has rejected right-to-privacy arguments, it has not
departed from the philosophical framework articulated in Pavesich. The
fundamental question remained whether there are legitimate third-party
claims that justify state intrusion beyond the boundary established by
invisibility. In Christensen v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the
sodomy law struck down in Powell two years later.1 6 The cases are not
entirely inconsistent, however. Christensen involved a solicitation for oral
sex at a public rest area, and the court noted the sting operation was
prompted by complaints from citizens who had been the subject of sexual
advances and complained."' The court justified the law by saying it
"promote[d] the public health, safety, morals, and welfare of its citizens,"
and suggested that "societal order" would be compromised by legalized
sodomy." 8 The court perceived that a legal act of sodomy was in some
sense visible by the public at large, influential, harmful, and therefore not
within the veil of obscurity required for protection. The fact that the
solicitation was public influenced the decision" 9 and made it hard for the
109. Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 100 S.E.2d 881, 882-83 (Ga. 1957) (internal
quotation marks omitted, first alteration in original) (rejecting an employee's claim that a letter
from a creditor to her employer violated her right to privacy, because "an employer has a natural
and proper interest in the debts of his employees").
110. Macon-Bibb County Water & Sewerage Auth. v. Reynolds, 299 S.E.2d 594, 596 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1983) (affirming a decision that the reduction in privacy caused by an easement could be
factored into the value of a taking).
111. Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 254 S.E.2d 146, 149 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that in an
action for wrongful discharge and defamation, the trial court should have charged the jury on the
right to privacy).
112. Zant v. Prevatte, 286 S.E.2d 715 (Ga. 1982).
113. State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989).
114. Harris v. Cox Enters., 348 S.E.2d 448,451 (Ga. 1986).
115. King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492 (Ga. 2000).
116. 468 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1996).
117. Id. at 189.
118. Id. at 190 & n.6.
119. See id. at 190 (Fletcher, J., concurring) ("Whatever the extent of the privacy rights
under the Georgia constitution of consenting adults in their homes, these rights do not protect
solicitation of explicit sexual acts from total strangers in public rest areas.").
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justices in the majority to see what one dissenting justice pointed out, that
the solicited sex would have occurred in the privacy (and obscurity) of a
hotel room and that it would have been noncommercial.' Since the
underlying act would have been private, and therefore legal, the solicitation
of the act could not be punished. 2 ' A second dissenting justice argued that
"the moral welfare of the public" did not present a compelling enough
reason to compromise the right to privacy. 2 2 What matters is not the
outcome of the case, but that the majority and minority spoke the same
language in debating whether the act would have been private. The central
question is whether the act in question is visible and harmful. The majority
opinion is consistent with Pavesich in that the case involved a public act (as
opposed to a private, invisible one), and the opinion performs the correct
balancing test in asking whether that act extends beyond the veil of privacy.
The only difference between Christensen and Powell is that the court
ceased to recognize the connection between sodomy and social upheaval,
an empirical, as opposed to philosophical, difference.
The court rejected other appeals to privacy in the realm of sexuality
only when the court found that the act was either not private or not
consensual. It upheld the solicitation-of-sodomy statute as applied to
public"2 3 and commercial sex,' and the sodomy statute as applied to
coerced sex'25 and sex with minors. 26 The court reaffirmed the state's
prohibitions on incest by reference to the coercive nature of the parent-child
relationship."' It upheld obscenity laws on the ground that they regulated
commercial, not private, behavior, 28 and as applied to protect minors."9
Even in decisions not related to sexuality, the court's touchstone was often
120. Id. at 191 (Sears, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 192.
122. Id. at 199 (Hunstein, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Stover v. State, 350 S.E.2d 577 (Ga. 1986) (denying a privacy challenge by a defendant
who had sex with a woman in the woods in the back of a pickup truck while his companions
waited nearby).
124. Howard v. State, 527 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. 2000) (upholding the solicitation conviction of a
defendant who locked a waitress in a restroom and demanded oral sex for twenty dollars). Courts
have long distinguished regulations of commercial activity from regulations that apply to private
individuals. This is why commercial sex loses the protection of the right to privacy, which is an
individual right. Even though commercial activity can take place within the private sphere, it is
not private because of its relation to money and the market.
125. King v. State, 458 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. 1995) (declining to reach the privacy question in a
sodomy case involving a sixteen-year-old stepdaughter because there was no evidence of
consent); Stover v. State, 350 S.E.2d 577 (Ga. 1986) (finding sodomy to be a lesser included
offense of aggravated sodomy); see also Mauk v. State, 529 S.E.2d 197 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
(upholding a sodomy conviction where the defendant forced a woman to perform oral sex at
knifepoint in a field beside a highway).
126. Ray v. State, 389 S.E.2d 326 (Ga. 1990); Gordon v. State, 360 S.E.2d 253 (Ga. 1987).
127. Benton v. State, 461 S.E.2d 202 (Ga. 1995); Richardson v. State, 353 S.E.2d 342 (Ga.
1987).
128. Morrison v. State, 526 S.E.2d 336 (Ga. 2000).
129. Hunter v. State, 361 S.E.2d 787 (Ga. 1987).
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the invisibility of the act 3' or its harmlessness. 3 Either way, the court has
seemed concerned with whether the act or its consequences could be seen,
whether they extended beyond the veil that shields our truly private acts.
Largely absent from the decisions were paragraphs of moralizing or
evaluation of the underlying act along some ethical spectrum. For the most
part, the court restrained itself from rhetoric akin to that in Bowers.
C. Tennessee
Of the state opinions striking down a sodomy law, Tennessee's bears
the closest resemblance to the federal jurisprudence. Ultimately, however,
the Tennessee test for privacy begins and ends as a spatial one, based both
in the limits of state power and the human need for private spaces.
In 1993, an intermediate state court of appeals struck down the state's
Homosexual Practices Act'32 for violating, inter alia, the right to privacy
under the state constitution. 33 It reasoned that because the law applied to
consensual sexual activity between adults "behind closed doors in an
individual's home"' 31 (the court emphasized precedents that shield the
home in particular135), it infringed the state constitutional right to privacy.136
The statute was, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny. Note an important
distinction between this case and Bowers: The Tennessee court first
considered whether the act fell within the category of "private" acts by
asking where it took place, and then it considered whether there was a
130. See Macon Tel. Publ'g Co. v. Tatum, 436 S.E.2d 655, 658 (Ga. 1993) (holding that a
rape victim could not recover damages when a newspaper published her name after she shot her
attacker because at that point she became an "object of a legitimate public interest"); Doe v.
Sears, 263 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. 1980) (holding that a newspaper could obtain the names and addresses
of delinquent public housing tenants because they waived their fight of privacy by not paying on
time, and the public has an interest in knowing who abuses the state's credit); Gouldman-Taber
Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 100 S.E.2d 881, 883 (Ga. 1957) (rejecting an employee's claim that a letter
from a creditor to her employer violated her right to privacy because in pursuing credit she waived
her rights against background checks and other communications to secure potential loans).
131. See Adams v. State, 498 S.E.2d 268 (Ga. 1998) (compelling a criminal defendant to
undergo an HIV test where a victim was at risk for transmission of the virus); Dep't of Corr. v.
Colbert, 391 S.E.2d 759 (Ga. 1990) (allowing random drug tests of prison officials because the
danger of transmission of illegal substances outweighed the invasion of privacy); Blincoe v. State,
204 S.E.2d 597, 598 (Ga. 1974) (upholding marijuana possession laws against a privacy challenge
because of sufficient evidence that marijuana is dangerous and explaining that "[i]f marijuana is a
perfectly harmless substance, then its possession can not constitutionally be made criminal" ).
132. Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) ("'It is a Class C
misdemeanor for any person to engage in consensual sexual penetration, as defined in § 39-13-
501(7), with a person of the same gender."' (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (199 1))).
133. Id. at 262.
134. Id. at 261.
135. Id. at 261 n,9 (citing Cravens v. State, 256 S.W. 431, 432 (Tenn. 1923) (extolling the
right against illegal searches as "the very foundation of our state"); and State v. Graham, 35
Tenn. (3 Sneed) 134 (1855) (emphasizing, in a public profanity case, the difference between
public acts and those conducted in private that cause no harm)).
136. Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 261-62.
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legitimate state objective that would justify regulation. The court did not
question whether the act was fundamental, but only whether it was visible.
The court rejected out of hand all of the state's arguments but one: The
act advanced the morals of Tennessee citizens, as defined by the majority of
those citizens. The court granted that morality provided a valid basis for
laws in general (and in this sense its reasoning was closer to the federal
approach than Georgia's and Kentucky's), but the court held that public
morality alone could not justify a compromise of fundamental rights such
as privacy.137 A law justified only by majoritarian morality would not
survive strict scrutiny.138 It was, therefore, both the invisibility of the act
and its harmlessness that left homosexual sex within the right to privacy.
Unlike the Georgia and Kentucky courts, this court relied much less on a
fundamental precedent with broad privacy language. The opinion was very
similar to Griswold in relying on a series of specific constitutional
protections to define the boundaries of a broader right to privacy.139 But like
those in Georgia and Kentucky, the opinion (and the precedent on which it
relied) emphasized the space an individual needs to be human, not the
content of what she wishes to do within that space. In this respect it is one
of the spatial privacy cases and distinguishable from the federal approach.
The right to privacy was first identified in the Tennessee Constitution in
1992, just four years earlier, in Davis v. Davis.1" In that case, the Tennessee
Supreme Court refused to let Mary Sue Davis donate frozen embryos to a
childless couple after her divorce from Junior Lewis Davis. Junior Davis
objected to the use of the embryos, fertilized with his sperm, and demanded
that they be destroyed. The court sided with Mr. Davis, finding that his
right not to procreate, located in his right to privacy, outweighed Mrs.
Davis's interests. 4' The decision relied heavily on federal case law,
emphasizing fundamental rights for the proposition that the decision to
procreate is fundamental enough to rest within the right to privacy. 42 At the
same time, however, the Tennessee court repeatedly mentioned
"autonomy" 143 and explained how privacy is rooted in individual liberty, a
137. See id. at 264-65. Note that the Tennessee Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a
right to privacy, however.
138. Id. at 266 ("Spiritual leadership, not the government, has the responsibility for striving
to improve the morality of individuals.").
139. See id. at 260 (relying on the freedom to worship, prohibitions against unreasonable
search and seizure, the freedom of speech and press, and prohibitions against the quartering of
soldiers).
140. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
141. Id. at 603.
142. As the Tennessee court described it, the right to liberty includes the right to privacy, and
although the boundaries of those rights are not clearly demarcated, the most fundamental rights
fall within them. See id. at 598-601.
143. Defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 130 (7th ed. 1999) as "the right of self-
government."
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liberty that runs "even to the extent of overthrowing the government." 144
That liberty erects a boundary between the government's power and the
private sphere, preventing "unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters such as the one now before us, involving intimate questions of
personal and family concern." "' The burden was on the state to justify
interference in the decision of the gamete-providers. Since "no other person
or entity has an interest sufficient to permit interference... because no one
else bears the consequences of these decisions in the way that the gamete-
providers do," the parties of the case had the right to control the disposition
of the embryos.1 46 Thus, even though there was something of the
"fundamentally affects" test within this opinion, it also relied on spatial
privacy by erecting a content-neutral boundary between the state and the
individual and requiring the government to justify interference. In other
words, of all three state precedents, Davis is the most like Griswold because
it contains two different approaches to privacy, one evaluating the nature of
the act, the other the act's place behind or in front of the privacy-autonomy
line. And, like the Supreme Court, Tennessee could have taken the right to
privacy in either direction and been consistent with precedent. It happened
to follow the broader interpretation, for in Campbell the language about the
fundamental, personal nature of the act in question, sodomy, all but
disappeared. Consensual adult sex was private not so much because of a
tradition of protecting certain sexual acts (the Bowers approach to the
question), but because the act took place in the home, a site of personal
autonomy.
Between Davis and Campbell the Tennessee Supreme Court considered
four other cases touching on the state right to privacy, all in the realm of
parental rights. 47 If nothing else, the line of Tennessee cases before
Campbell would have made it very easy for the state's supreme court to
dismiss Campbell's challenge even more easily than Justice White did
Michael Hardwick's. Privacy, until that point, applied only to the realm of
family and home. That Tennessee did not do this, even against popular
144. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599.
145. Id. at 600.
146. Id. at 602.
147. See Simmons v. Simmons, 900 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. 1995) (denying grandparents'
visitation request where the children were in custody of the natural mother and her second
husband, an adoptive father); Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674 (Tenn. 1994) (relying in part on
the state right to privacy in granting a natural father's request for custody over the prospective
adoptive parents' request); Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1994) (eliminating
parental immunity in the case of an automobile accident where the child died); Hawk v. Hawk,
855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993) (striking down the Grandparents' Visitation Act as a violation of fit,
married parents' right to privacy in parenting decisions). Subsequently, the Tennessee Supreme
Court denied that the right to privacy created a cause of action against private actors, Stein v.
Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. 1997), and struck down a statute restricting abortion
as a violation of the right to privacy, Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d I (Tenn. 2000).
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opinion, 4 ' suggests the power of a content-neutral precedent. Tennessee is
a particularly interesting case because its privacy jurisprudence lines up
with federal law at two crucial points. Davis, like Griswold, provided both
an act-based and a spatial justification for the right to privacy, and
subsequent decisions on the right to privacy were about the family and
procreation, even more, it would seem, than Eisenstadt and Roe. The most
relevant difference, it seems, is that where Griswold backed away from the
spatial justification and relied most on the fundamental rights of married
persons, Davis relied in great part on the state constitution and the argument
for privacy from autonomy. Prior to Davis the Tennessee courts did not
deal frequently with privacy challenges, but the supreme court never
rejected a state-based right to privacy. Certain cases suggested in dicta a
common-law (as opposed to constitutional) right to privacy existed in the
state,'49 and two other cases upheld laws against federal privacy challenges
on public safety grounds. 5 '
D. Causation or Correlation?
The above discussion reveals that the Kentucky, Georgia, and
Tennessee supreme courts have approached the question of privacy
differently from the Supreme Court, even though all four courts interpreted
constitutions that make no specific mention of the right to privacy, and two
of the three state courts dealt with challenges to sodomy laws by same-sex
couples."' Two states embraced rights to privacy long before the Supreme
Court, and all three state courts provided a thicker philosophical
justification, each with a slightly different emphasis. These courts
specifically avoided evaluating the act in question for its traditional value or
fundamental nature and instead asked content-neutral questions: Is the act
visible? Is the act harmful to third parties or those who cannot consent?
Does the government have a justification to act? The strong claim of this
Note, then, is that the original precedents of Pavesich, Campbell, and, to a
148. See infra notes 153-158 and accompanying text.
149. See Martin v. Senators, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. 1967) (holding that the plaintiff
waived whatever right to privacy might have existed); Langford v. Vanderbilt Univ., 287 S.W.2d
32 (Tenn. 1956) (assuming for purposes of the case that a right to privacy existed and holding that
it had been waived). But see Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. 1997)
(dismissing a suit against an employer by a former employee who was fired after a random drug
test because the right to privacy does not apply against private parties).
150. See Gaskin v. State, 490 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. 1973) (upholding a statute prohibiting
marijuana possession); Arutanoff v. Metro. Gov't, 448 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1969) (upholding a
statute requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets).
151. Some courts have struck down sodomy laws when challenged by heterosexuals. See,
e.g., State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y.
1980). Although it is possible that the sexuality of the parties affects the outcome of sodomy
cases, that is a topic for a different Note.
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lesser extent, Davis accomplished what Griswold could not: They laid the
groundwork for future privacy decisions and allowed for analysis, not
merely a subjective interpretation of how important (or popular) a particular
act is. As one scholar put it:
Any analysis of a constitutional right of privacy must be founded
on an understanding of the underlying premise for the right. The
philosophical or political basis for a privacy right will determine
the scope of that right. Although the Supreme Court has couched
the privacy right in many different terms, the Bowers opinion
reflected a narrow right delimited by the majority's determination
of which conduct was valuable to society.
152
When Bowers reached the Supreme Court, it was too easy for Justice White
to look at Griswold and conclude that it was "facetious" to protect
homosexual sodomy with the right to privacy. We can only wonder what
the Court would have done had the original declaration of the right to
privacy offered more substance. Certainly, it would not have been as easy
to dismiss Hardwick's claims if a Fourth Amendment-style boundary
between home and state were present.
To this claim that an early philosophical stance accounted for the
different results in Bowers on one hand, and Wasson, Powell, and Campbell
on the other, one might reply that the decisions were handed down at
different times"3 and, therefore, are a result of a shift in public opinion that
has occurred on the question of homosexuality in recent years. This
response, although understandable, is ultimately unpersuasive. In 1986, the
year Bowers was handed down, 54% of Americans said that homosexual
relations between consenting adults should not be legal, and 51% of
Americans said they approved of Bowers.'54 In 1992, the year Kentucky's
supreme court decided Wasson, 49% of respondents in the South opposed
decriminalization of sodomy 55 and 61% said it was not an acceptable
alternative lifestyle, 15 6 hardly a progressive sea change from 1986. The
Gallup organization stopped asking about sodomy laws in 1996, but in that
year 52% of those in the South said they opposed decriminalization of
152. Elizabeth A. Leveno, Comment, New Hope for the New Federalism: State
Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1029, 1043 (1994). This
comment provides a useful comparison of Bowers and several state decisions. Primarily, however,
the author argues that Bowers got the right to privacy wrong by failing to recognize how broad the
federal right to privacy really is. In contrast, this Note argues that the federal right really is not
broader than Bowers concluded. Further, this Note focuses on the evolution of the right to privacy
in state jurisdictions, something the comment does not consider.
153. 1986, 1992, 1998, and 1996, respectively.
154. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1986, at 213-14 (1987).
155. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1992, at 101 (1993).
156. Id. at 100.
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homosexual relations between consenting adults, and only 39% favored. 57
In 1998, when Powell was decided, 66% of people in the South, and 59% of
people across America, said they thought homosexual behavior was morally
wrong."s
In other words, at the time the U.S. Supreme Court denied privacy
rights to homosexuals, not much more of the national population agreed
with it than did the constituency of the supreme courts in Kentucky,
Georgia, and Tennessee, which appeared to act against public opinion. It is
too facile a response to say that time and public tolerance account for the
difference in the opinions.
E. Other Decisions
Leaving aside the claim of causation, there is no question that most
courts rely on a definition of privacy that is spatial, as opposed to act-based,
when invalidating sodomy laws. Because there is value in appreciating the
different ways courts approach the question of privacy in the context of
sodomy laws, I review here three decisions by state courts that for some
reason are inappropriate for discussion above with Georgia, Kentucky, and
Tennessee, but nevertheless deserve some attention. They are worth
exploring quickly, for they share with Powell, Wasson, and Campbell a
decision not to evaluate the underlying act in deciding the boundaries of
privacy, choosing instead to rely on a content-neutral boundary between the
state and the individual.
In a decision later overruled for want of jurisdiction, a Texas appellate
court struck down the state's sodomy law in 1992, basing its decision on the
state's implied constitutional right of privacy.15 9 The very first sentence of
the opinion is a clarion call for the spatial approach to privacy: "This
157. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1996, at 158 (1997).
158. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., Th1E GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1998, at 213-14 (1999).
159. State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App. 1992), rev'd, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994).
Lesbians and gay men brought a civil suit to enjoin the state from enforcing the sodomy law.
Avoiding the merits entirely, the Texas Supreme Court concluded the courts lacked equity
jurisdiction to grant such prospective relief where prosecution is not imminent. Last year an
intermediate state appellate court again invalidated the law, which applies only to same-sex
sodomy, in an appeal by two homosexual men convicted of having sex with each other in the
privacy of their own home. This time the ground was sex discrimination in violation of the state's
Equal Rights Amendment. Lawrence v. State, Nos. 14-99-00109-CR, 14-99-00111-CR (Tex. Ct.
App. June 8, 2000), http://www.lambdalegal.org/sections/library/decisionslawrence.pdf. The
court specifically avoided the privacy issue, and the decision came with a political price for the
judge who authored the opinion. See Alan Bernstein, Republicans Target One of Their Own,
HOUSTON CHRON., July 4, 2000, at Al. Then, last spring, the court of appeals heard the case en
banc and vacated the opinion. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001), petition for
discretionary review filed, No. 0873-01 (Tex. Crim. App. May 18, 2001). That court rejected both
the equal protection and the privacy claims advanced by the defendants with analysis that
mirrored the Supreme Court's in Bowers, relying on history and tradition and doing nothing to
distinguish the state and federal rights at issue. See id. at 360-62.
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appeal involves the limits on the government's right to intrude into an
individual's private life, and the extent of an individual's right to be let
alone." "6 As do the three state decisions above, this one relied on an older
state precedent setting forth the right to privacy in content-neutral terms.
"[The] right to privacy should yield only when the government can
demonstrate that an intrusion is reasonably warranted for the achievement
of a compelling governmental objective that can be achieved by no less
intrusive, more reasonable means." "' A line in space exists between the
state and the individual, and the former must justify transgressions of that
line into private space. Of course, this only begs the question, What is
private? To this the Morales court merely asserted, "We can think of
nothing more fundamentally private and deserving of protection than sexual
behavior between consenting adults in private." 162 The court in that formula
limited the inquiry to the invisible and the consensual, leaving only the
question of third-party harms. To the state's justification that the law
advances public morality, the court replied that the state did not provide
sufficient evidence to that effect. 63
What is telling about the disposition of this case, from the standpoint of
this Note, is that the state supreme court reversed on other grounds. If we
cynically assume that it did so because it disagreed with the lower court's
result, we must confront the fact that the court did not reverse on the merits.
In other words, it could not get around (or would not admit to
circumventing) the precedent of Employees Union, which articulated a
spatial approach to privacy. This is the strongest evidence available for the
claim advanced by this Note that the way a jurisdiction first approaches the
question of privacy influences how it decides controversial cases later. The
Texas Supreme Court could not have written a Bowers because as long as it
followed precedent, it was required to consider the question of sodomy
from the standpoint of third-party harms and visibility. The intrusion that
sodomy laws present would have to be justified based on third-party harms
that create a "compelling state interest." From that perspective, it would
have been much harder to make this liberal result just disappear. Enter the
doctrine of standing, an easy way to make it all go away without ignoring
stare decisis. 6" And so although Texas reveals that a helpful precedent does
160. Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 202.
161. Tex. State Employees Union v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746
S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987) (recognizing a right to privacy under the state constitution and
striking down a defendant's policy of requiring employees to take an intrusive polygraph test).
162. Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 204.
163. See id. at 205.
164. It remains to be seen whether a more recent intermediate court of appeals opinion doing
just that-applying Bowers-type reasoning to uphold the state's sodomy law-will withstand
scrutiny. See supra note 159. Even if it does, the tortured history of challenges to sodomy laws in
Texas suggests that a content-neutral privacy opinion can do a lot to complicate the question of
privacy in a jurisdiction.
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not guarantee the "right" result, it does suggest that a "wrong" result-one
that relies only on the judge's reactions to what he considers icky-is more
difficult.
A New Jersey appellate court in 1978 overturned a conviction under
that state's sodomy law, 65 relying heavily on a prior state supreme court
precedent that struck down the state's law against heterosexual
fornication. 6 6 It did so in spite of an earlier state supreme court precedent
rejecting a federal privacy challenge to the same state sodomy law.
167
Certainly, the facts at bar were not sympathetic ones: A man who
performed fellatio on a sixteen-year-old boy was accused of assault with
intent to commit sodomy. Regardless of consent (a fact that was disputed),
this was not a defendant likely to find many allies in the judiciary.
Nevertheless, the court was clear that "the individual's right of personal
privacy and autonomy prevail[s] over the state's right to regulate private
sexual conduct." '68 It concluded that the Saunders decision, overturning the
fornication statute, contained a rationale of personal autonomy that could
not be narrowed to exclude homosexual sex:
"To the extent that [the fornication statute] serves as an official
sanction of certain conceptions of desirable lifestyles, social mores
or individualized beliefs, it is not an appropriate exercise of the
police power.
Fornication may be abhorrent to the morals and deeply held
beliefs of many persons. But any appropriate 'remedy' for such
conduct cannot come from legislative fiat. Private personal acts
between two consenting adults are not to be lightly meddled with
by the State. The right of personal autonomy is fundamental to a
free society.... [T]he liberty which is the birthright of every
individual suffers dearly when the State can so grossly intrude on
personal autonomy." 69
165. State v. Ciuffini, 395 A.2d 904 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). The legislature had
repealed the sodomy law prior to this court's judgment, but the change would not take effect until
1979. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:98-2 (West 1995) (repealing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:143-1 (West
1985)). The court took judicial notice of this fact but did not treat it as dispositive.
166. State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 339 (N.J. 1977) ("Although persons may differ as to
the propriety and morality of such conduct.., such a decision [to fornicate or not] is necessarily
encompassed in the concept of personal autonomy which our Constitution seeks to safeguard.").
The Saunders court specifically relied on the state constitution in light of the U.S. Supreme
Court's summary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), which upheld
Virginia's sodomy statute as applied to gay men.
167. State v. Lair, 301 A.2d 748 (N.J. 1973) (holding that the state's sodomy statute could
not be applied to married couples after Griswold, but that its application to unmarried persons, gay
or straight, was permissible).
168. Ciuffini, 395 A.2d at 907 (citing Saunders, 381 A.2d at 342 n.8).
169. Id. at 908 (quoting Saunders, 381 A.2d at 342-43).
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Because the legislature repealed the state's sodomy law during the
Ciuffini case, no judicial attention was ever paid to the issue again, but it is
notable that this particular court relied on a heterosexual state privacy
precedent emphasizing autonomy to overturn a homosexual sodomy
conviction. In line with the thesis of this Note, a privacy precedent
grounded in autonomy can make the difference when it comes to judicial
decisions about unpopular but private activity.
Pennsylvania's supreme court struck down the state's Voluntary
Deviate Sexual Intercourse Statute in 1980 when two erotic dancers who
performed oral sex on bar patrons challenged the law.17 ° Technically the
decision did not involve the right to privacy, because the court reached only
the Equal Protection Clauses of both the state and federal constitutions.' T
But although the court assumed away the privacy question, there is much
language in the opinion delimiting the police powers of the state.'72 The
opinion quoted heavily from Mill for the proposition that public morality is
not a valid state objective. "Spiritual leadership, not the government, has
the responsibility for striving to improve the morality of individuals." "'
Again we see an emphasis on the line between public and private, rendering
state regulation of morality presumptively invalid.
F. The Benefits of a Spatial Approach
Even if you remain unconvinced that prior privacy precedents account
for the outcomes of later sodomy cases (the strong claim of this Note), there
is still value in a spatial approach to privacy. In this Section, I explain why
the spatial approach to privacy, and its implicit reliance on the harm
principle, is not only viable but also better than the act-based approach
currently in place.
Earlier I defined spatial privacy as a right delineated by content-neutral
boundaries drawn in space: Any acts, regardless of their character,
occurring within those boundaries are protected as private. Of course, no
one would support an absolute right to spatial privacy, for that would
protect heinous crimes as long as they occurred indoors, and so advocates
temper this standard by requiring that a valid legislative objective be met
170. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
171. Id. at 51 ("Assuming, without deciding, that no fundamental interest is at stake (i.e., the
right of privacy), so that strict scrutiny of the classification is not required, the classification still
denies equal protection .... ").
172. See id. at 50 (finding that the sole purpose of the statute was "to regulate the private
conduct of consenting adults," a purpose "not properly in the realm of the temporal police
power").
173. Id.
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before private acts can be regulated.174 This Note (and the spatial privacy
cases it cites) has assumed that spatial privacy is limited only by third-party
harms. This is a large assumption on which there is no consensus. For some
authors government is responsible for more than just the prevention of
harm.' 7" Instead of remaining neutral on questions of the good life,"
6 the
state exists in part to reflect (and perhaps to define) our conceptions of the
good. And even if we accept the harm principle as the boundary of privacy,
it is not at all clear what counts as a third-party harm.'77 But justifying
modern liberalism is beyond the scope of this Note. Suffice it to say that the
substantive right to privacy requires limits on the state's power to validate
value choices. Once you accept the right, you must adopt the harm principle
to some degree. As for what counts as harm, there must be some judicially
cognizable boundary between the harm caused by, say, rape, which the
right to privacy ought not sustain, and the sense of rejection that arises from
not being able to codify one's values.178
174. Indeed, the right to privacy has been criticized for its tendency to protect private harms,
especially the subordination of women. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 191, 194 (1989) ("This right to privacy is a right of men 'to be let alone'
to oppress women one at a time.... Privacy law keeps some men out of the bedrooms of other
men."); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2152 (1996) (documenting the reluctance of courts to punish wife beaters, citing
the need to shield the private institution of marriage from the gaze of the law). This is a problem
not so much with the spatial approach or the ight to privacy, however, as it is with the court's
understanding of what counts as harm. The approach to privacy proposed here would give no
quarter to private harms merely because of their privacy.
175. See, e.g., PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENTORCEMENT OF MORALS 7-10, 12-22 (1968)
(arguing for a public morality on the ground that a community, in order to have any meaning as
such, requires a common moral language, a set of shared ideas). "The bondage [of public
morality] is part of the price of society; and mankind, which needs society, must pay its price....
No society can do without intolerance, indignation, and disgust." Id. at 10, 17; see also J.M.
Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 (1997) (arguing that politics is a contest of
shifting "status hierarchies"); Dan Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARv. L.
REV. 413 (1999) (arguing that the criminal law exists in part to express our contempt for certain
actions and people, codifying our values and way of life).
176. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
177. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987)
(arguing that certain acts, even private ones, hurt all of us by undermining basic notions of human
dignity and defending laws against prostitution on that basis); Rubenfeld, supra note 8, at 765
(arguing that a limit on the community's right to define itself can be construed as a third-party
harm). See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 113 (1999) (tracing the appropriation of the harm principle by legal moralists
and noting that "[c]laims of harm have become so pervasive that the harm principle has become
meaningless"). Harcourt notes that arguments over the regulation of homosexual conduct have
shifted from Bowers to the present, from legal moralism to harm, particularly anxiety over AIDS.
See Harcourt, supra, at 161-67.
178. Certainly, this line exists in tort law. In adapting it to constitutional law we must start by
rejecting the claim, which draws strength from Balkin, supra note 175, Kahan, supra note 175,
and Rubenfeld, supra note 8, that the law's rejection of a certain set of norms counts as a
judicially cognizable harm. Of course, this leaves the nontrivial arguments that certain private
acts, like viewing pornography and prostitution, involve third-party harms, and these arguments
are not easily dismissed. See Harcourt, supra note 177, at 183-86. My point here, however, is not
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Progressives who favor individual rights and negative liberty should
favor a spatial approach to privacy and the harm principle because they are
more likely to produce the results they want. 7 9 If the burden is placed on
the state to justify regulation that intrudes beyond a certain boundary, it
becomes more difficult to use the criminal law as a tool to subordinate
certain groups and values, and a trove of laws are weakened. Take laws
against interracial sex acts and adultery as two examples. There should be
no question that these laws aim to subordinate two groups, racial minorities
and women. 8 ° Imagine each group brings suit, challenging the laws.
Because the laws regulate actions that happen outside the view of others,
and between consenting adults, the plaintiffs will easily make out their
prima facie cases that there is a violation of their right to privacy. The
burden will then shift to the state to prove one of two things: Either the act
involves harm to one of the participants, or the act has externalities that
harm society in a judicially cognizable way. Because the adults consent
(and are bringing suit), it would be very difficult to win on the first claim.
As to the second, the plaintiffs have a good chance because it will be more
difficult for the state to show that the acts cause harm (and not merely
offense or speculative damages). Even if the plaintiffs do not ultimately
prevail, they have an easier case. The elements of the right to privacy take
the weight off tradition, benefiting any progressive agenda, which by
definition opposes the past.'' And spatial privacy puts the judge on notice
that personal values are not as relevant. He can disregard that notice, but to
the extent that you believe judges make a good faith effort to follow the
law, a doctrine that explicitly removes the expressive, moralistic character
of judgments about privacy is less likely to produce subjective results." 2
that the harm principle dissolves the difficult question of what counts as private, but that it
produces a more productive discussion than one rooted in history and tradition.
179. But see Michelman, supra note 14, at 1532-37 (arguing that privacy rights do not
diminish public stigma against minorities like gays, and concluding that only a republican
conception of privacy that recognizes its public significance as a political right can prevent that);
Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77
CAL. L. REV. 521 (1989) (arguing that an approach to gay rights that does not validate same-sex
intimacy as morally equivalent is bound to fail because the law must be concerned with the
morality or immorality of the substantive act).
180. Adultery laws, to the extent they are traditionally enforced only against women, are a
staple of the state's control over women's sexual agency. See Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt,
84 VA. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (1998).
181. See Robert Post, Tradition, the Self and Substantive Due Process: A Comment on
Michael Sandel, 77 CAL. L. REV. 553, 556 (1989) (noting that substantive due process moved
away from history and tradition to autonomy and choice as the Court found it impossible to justify
the right to privacy in the realm of nonmarital sex).
182. Consider also Dan Kahan's observation that "[l]iberal political culture stigmatizes
public appeals to contested moral values." Kahan, supra note 175, at 445. An argument against
sodomy that relies on social cataclysm is a bold statement of moral values that would be
unpopular. For an example, see Kahan's discussion of the backlash endured by a judge who
openly justified mitigating the sentence of a husband who killed his unfaithful wife. Id. at 490-91.
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Of course, you can imagine an opinion upholding sodomy or other
morality laws on the basis of cognizable harms to society.1 83 But even
though spatial privacy does not guarantee the "right" result, it is still
preferable to the act-based approach. In the examples above, it would
certainly be plausible to imagine a judge finding judicially cognizable harm
in permitting adultery.' 84 He could write an opinion justifying laws against
adultery on the ground that children are harmed by infidelity, and the state
has an interest in preventing such harm. Or he could attempt to find harm,
not merely offense, to society in the cataclysmic breakdown of the family
and social order that would presumably result from increased infidelity. He
would, in short, be making empirical findings of fact as to the extent that
adultery harms other people, and they might justify the status quo. This
would be a better opinion than one that relies on the longstanding tradition
of laws against adultery for three reasons.
First, we would be having an open debate about what really matters, the
present-day norms and empirical assumptions that support a particular law,
and not history and tradition. As Holmes wrote:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.85
What matters is whether the law is a good law, that is, whether it
accomplishes the legitimate ends of government. A debate about whether a
certain act should be stigmatized through criminalization because of its
negative effects on society is far more consistent with that goal than a
debate about tradition. Second, this debate, over harm instead of status, is
the discussion we want to encourage in a deliberative democracy. Instead of
183. See, e.g., Christensen v. State. 468 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ga. 1996) (citing the breakdown of
morality and eventual erosion of societal order). Even more plausible is an opinion justifying laws
against abortion on the basis of third-party harm to the fetus. See, e.g., State v. Munson, 201
N.W.2d 123 (S.D. 1972) (upholding an abortion statute because of the fetus's interest in life);
Thompson v. State, 493 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (same). This analysis satisfies the
spatial privacy approach because it focuses on a balancing of privacy interests and harm. Of
course, this makes the status of the fetus primary, but that question is at the root of the debate over
abortion anyway. Courts should therefore state their position plainly, instead of pretending, as did
the Court in Roe, that there is a way to resolve challenges to abortion laws without taking a
position on whether the fetus is human. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) ("We need
not resolve the difficult question of when life begins." ).
184. The claim that miscegenation is destructive to society would be harder to make in
today's political climate, but in some regions I do not doubt its emotional appeal. Certainly, it was
viable just a few decades ago in the same way the adultery argument is today. Note also that
judges in the spatial privacy states uphold drug laws, laws against prostitution, and even sodomy
laws, justifying the laws based on harm, not tradition. Spatial privacy is not a formula for absolute
negative liberty.
185. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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debating whether adultery and adulterers are good or bad people, the
language of the debate-as framed by the doctrine of the courts-would be
over harm. To the extent that the public debates issues using the vocabulary
provided by elites, a judicial opinion that discusses harm (instead of moral
status) would diminish (but not eliminate) the element of status in the
public discourse. Third, to the extent that a discussion of harm requires a
more candid discussion of the moral norms underlying criminal laws, an
open debate about harm is a predicate to challenging the law. As Dan
Kahan has argued, an open debate about public meanings makes it easier to
challenge those meanings.1 6 If privacy jurisprudence relies on history,
instead of demanding that judges candidly discuss the harm that
homosexuals allegedly cause today, it will be difficult to refute the
argument that really underlies the opinion. So even in the situations where
spatial privacy does not compel a certain result, debates framed by the harm
principle are more consistent with certain democratic values that
progressives (as well as others) favor.
Of course, the spatial approach to privacy is not new. It was the
conventional way of understanding the limits of state power under the
Fourth Amendment for the better part of its history.'87 The Court abandoned
this approach, however, finding that it relied on an unacceptable premise
that "property interests control the right of the Government to search and
seize." "' That shift was well received by commentators concerned with the
right to privacy,"' and to the extent this evolution recognizes that privacy
186. Kahan, supra note 175, at 418 ("Not talking about these meanings in a public way
doesn't render them inert; if anything, norms that discourage divisive public discourse extend the
life of these meanings by making it harder for their critics to expose them and easier for their
beneficiaries to disclaim their significance ...... ).
187. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The Court found that without"entry," id. at 464, or "invasion," id. at 466, of private space by law enforcement, there was no
search or seizure sufficient to implicate Fourth Amendment concerns. See also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (confirming that "the absence of... [physical] penetration was
at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry"). I have studiously avoided
discussing the Fourth Amendment because the right to privacy it protects is not substantive: It
limits the government's access to information about you, but it provides no negative liberty, no
increased freedom to make choices. Therefore, it has little to say about the merits of sodomy
legislation.
188. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[O]nce it is recognized that
the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches
and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id.; see also Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (" A discreet selective wiretap or electronic 'bugging'
is of course not rummaging around, collecting everything in the particular time and space zone.
But even though it is limited in time, it is the greatest of all invasions of privacy."). It is worth
noting that the Court abandoned this spatial approach in the same year that it announced the
general right to privacy in Griswold. Perhaps this explains Griswold's reliance on history, instead
of space.
189. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 489-93 (1968) (discussing how
monitoring, like wiretapping, implicates fundamental human values protected by the right to
privacy); Harry L. Strayhan, Case Note, 14 LOY. L. REv. 370, 375-77 (1967-1968) (outlining the
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can be invaded without physical intrusion, it is a victory for a more robust
conception of the right. But certain spaces are more important, and
therefore we must not abandon the spatial approach entirely. In fact, the
Court's own decisions bear this out, for they continue to emphasize the
unique nature of the home as a site of particular protection.90 A lesson of
the Fourth Amendment, therefore, is that the remainder of the Supreme
Court's privacy doctrine, the portion that guarantees substantial freedoms,
must return to an understanding of privacy rooted in space.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has declared a right to privacy, but its formulation
of this right is senseless, protecting certain sexual acts but not others, solely
on the basis of personal approval or dislike. In contrast, every state court
that has struck down sodomy laws on state privacy grounds has used a
different method, a different way of framing the question. These decisions
have three things in common. First, they take the weight off the merits of
the act in question. They emphasize either the limits of state power or the
location of the act. Second, they all balance the homosexuals' claims
against third-party harm, not merely dislike. And third, all have their roots
in the first privacy cases in their jurisdictions. From this difference between
the state and federal lines of cases, I propose a new way of understanding
the right to privacy.
This Note has advanced two claims, one descriptive, the other
normative. The first claim is causal. In jurisdictions where initial privacy
precedents created a content-neutral line between the government and the
state, it is more likely that a challenge to the jurisdiction's sodomy law will
be successful, because of how the jurisdiction first framed the question.
Meanwhile, in a jurisdiction where privacy protection is defined by
tradition, there is little chance that nontraditional behavior will be
protected-no matter how private, in the sense of being invisible,
unnoticeable, harmless, and important to an individual. The second claim is
evolution from places to persons as the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment and calling Katz the
"correct interpretation" ). Of course, the "expectation of privacy" test that replaced the spatial
approach has been the target of searing criticism. See, e.g., Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael
Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19 (1988). Often, this
criticism targets apparent inconsistencies and the formalism that creates them. See id. at 22-28. In
this way, the modem Fourth Amendment has something in common with the substantive right to
privacy born in Griswold.
190. See Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (2001) (holding the warrantless use of
thermal imaging unconstitutional because, " [i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying govemment eyes" ); Minnesota v. Olson,
495 U.S. 91 (1990) (holding that an overnight guest has a sufficient expectation of privacy in his
host's home that a warrant is required for the guest's arrest); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980) (requiring a warrant to arrest a person in his own home, but not in public).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2002] 1029
The Yale Law Journal
that this spatial approach to privacy is a better approach to the right to
privacy for two main reasons. First, it is a more meaningful right. It
downplays a judge's moral opinions and majoritarian impulses, exactly
what the right to privacy is supposed to do. Second, even if it does not
guarantee the legalization of certain acts, it yields a better debate. By
forcing judges to be up-front about what matters today (third-party harms,
instead of tradition), underlying attitudes that obstruct progressive
legalization are exposed, and that, at the very least, is more consistent with
norms of the law and democracy. Finally, this Note suggests that there is,
indeed, merit to the old saw that federalism makes laboratories of the
states, "'9 1 allowing for experimentation with different policies so that the
best might win out.'92
Perhaps you do not think the judiciary should be making judgments
about harm. Perhaps you think it is a legislative decision, that drug use or
prostitution in private causes harm. This point is well taken, but I argue
here only for a better way of understanding the right to privacy. This
critique proves too much, in that it ultimately challenges such a right (and
probably all judicially protected rights). We can argue over whether certain
actions, including sodomy, drug use, and prostitution, cause third-party
harms, but that is a far more productive discussion than one about our
traditional preferences. On the other hand, perhaps you are more of a legal
realist. You might not think it matters very much whether a court five or
fifty years ago had a certain approach to privacy, because when it comes to
hot-button issues like homosexuality, or novel rights like privacy, popular
opinion and instinct will influence judges more than any other factors.193
This might be so, but this Note suggests that a philosophically robust
precedent would make a more expansive decision easier for the wavering
judge like Justice Powell. In other words, homophobes or originalists might
decide Bowers the same way regardless of what precedent said, but it
certainly would be more difficult and more obvious. And this cannot be
anything but good, because whatever you may think of their bedrooms,
surely judges have no right to keep their rationales private.
191. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
192. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (urging states to pick up the banner that the Supreme Court let fall
and expand the scope of individual liberties under state constitutions); see also William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of
Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986) (same); Nan Feyler, Note, The Use of the State
Constitutional Right to Privacy To Defeat Sodomy Laws, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 973
(1986) (urging states with constitutional rights to privacy to strike down their sodomy laws);
Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1324 (1982) (surveying state expansions of rights beyond the federal guarantees). But see Recent
Case, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1370 (1993) (suggesting state courts that deviate from federal
understandings of fundamental rights are sincere eccentrics).
193. Certainly, many a practitioner carefully counts the noses on the bench in deciding when
and where to challenge the state. Rawls, supra note 4.
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